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Some Specific Needs Of the Close Corporation Not Met
Under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act:
Suggestions for Statutory Relief
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the close corporation' has become an increasingly prevalent way of doing business, until today it is the
2
most common form of corporate enterprise in the United States.
1. Defining the term "close corporation" has proved a problem to
scholars, judges and legislators. For an extended discussion of the
several definitions in common use see 1 IF.O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATEONS
§ 1.02, at 2 (1958). As Professor O'Neal points out, the most popular
definitions merely attempt to distinguish the corporation with relatively few shareholders from the publicly held corporation. Thus the
close corporation is often defined as a company with only a few shareholders, or a corporation whose shares are not generally traded on the
securities market. Some scholars, however, recognizing that a great
majority of American corporations possess these characteristics, have
attempted to further refine and limit the scope of the term "close corporation." Some, for example, emphasize the partnership nature of the
close corporation, defining it as one in which management and ownership coalesce.
Statutory definitional attempts in the past have, for the most part,
adopted these popular definitions. Often states make the advantages of
close corporation legislation available only to the corporation whose
"[shares are not] listed on a national securities exchange or regularly
quoted in an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a
national or an affiliated securities association ...
"
N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw § 630(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969). See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1216.22(c), 12-22.14(b) (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.0100 (2) (Supp.
1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (b) (1965). Several legislatures, however,
have adopted more limiting provisions in an attempt to restrict access to
the advantages of close corporation legislation. The most specific statutory definition is found in Delaware's General Corporation Law, which
has three requirements:
(1) All of the corporation's issued stock of all classes, exclu-

sive of treasury shares, shall be held of record by not more than
a specified number of persons, not exceeding thirty; and
(2) All of the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to
one or more of the restrictions on transfer permitted by section
202 of this title; and
(3) The corporation shall make no offering of any of its stock
which would constitute a "public offering" within the meaning
of the United States Securities Act of 1933 as it may be
amended from time to time.

DEL. CODE ANm. tit. 8, § 342 (a) (1967). This definition is discussed in
detail in Note, Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. U.L. REV.
230 (1968).
For the purposes of this note, a close corporation is a corporation
which has relatively few shareholders, whose shareholders are active in
the management of the business and whose shares are not generally

traded on the market. For a suggested statutory definition for the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, see note 60, infra.
2. Termery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question
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It has been employed to achieve the ends of enterprises ranging
in size from the ordinary family business to the Ford Motor
empire.3 The universal acceptance of the close corporation as a
business concept has, however, far outdistanced any concomitant development of applicable legal concepts. Since many legislatures have failed to distinguish the close corporation from its
publicly held counterpart, the owners of a closely held corporation-who still view themselves essentially as partners-must
conduct their business in conformity with statutory norms
created for the widely held corporation. Many of these norms
are clearly burdensome to the owners of a close corporation,
and considerable imagination and ingenuity has been required
to substitute advantageous partnership characteristics. 4 For exexample, free transferability of shares is just as repugnant
to the owners of a close corporation as is free transferability
of partnership interests to a partnership. Thus in order to
preserve the shareholders' right to determine with whom they
will be associated in business, the close corporation often restricts
the transferability of its shares. 5 Another problem results from
the fact that the investment of all shareholders is, in effect,
locked into the close corporation. 6 Due to this difficulty, the
traditional corporate concept of majority rule is intolerable to
minority shareholders, and all participants are often given a
veto power over corporate actions. 7 With this veto power, however, comes an appreciably greater possibility of corporate deadlock, making agreements relating to arbitration, buy-outs or dissolution a practical necessity.8
Among the devices used to secure the advantages of a partnership are preincorporation agreements, special clauses in the
charter and bylaws, restrictions on the transfer of shares, poolof Economic Validity, 14 HoWARD L.J. 214, 253 (1968).

Tennery esti-

mates that the close corporation outnumbers the publicly held corporation by 20 to 1.

3. More importantly from the standpoint of the legal practitioner, it is perhaps the only form of corporation with which a large
portion of the bar ever becomes familiar. See Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW. 741 (1958).
4. 1 F. O'NrAL, supra note 1, § 1.13, at 26.
5. See part IB infra.
6. Even absent restrictions on transferability, the owner of minority shares in a close corporation would still have his investment locked
into the corporation if his shares had no veto power, since he would
find no ready market for them.
7. See part hA infra.
8. See parts lID & HE infra.
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ing agreements, voting trusts and irrevocable proxiesY There
are, however, many inherent dangers in using these devices.
Any agreement contravening established corporate norms is
always of doubtful enforceability,10 and attempts designed to
give partnership attributes to close corporations have at times
been rejected by courts.1 Such rejection is generally premised
upon the supposed illegitimacy of any attempt to obtain simultaneously the best of both the corporate and partnership worlds.
This view was expressed by one court as follows:
The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business
as partners may incorporate, with the intent to obtain the advantages and immunities of a corporate form and then, Proteuslike, become at will a copartnership or a corporation, as the

exigencies or purpose of their joint enterprise may from time

to time require. 12

This judicial attitude, in conjunction with the failure of legislatures to enact realistic schemes for the close corporation, has
received increasing criticism from a host of commentators.' s
The critics point out that businessmen's legitimate needs find ex9. Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close
Corporation,33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700, 701 (1958).
10. See parts IIA, IIC & ID infra.
11. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-TheNeed
for More and Improved Legislation, 54 Gro. L.J. 1145 (1966).
12. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 599, 75 A. 568, 571 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1910). In this case the two sole shareholders of a corporation
agreed in an elaborate writing that the enterprise was to be operated in all respects as a partnership with both shareholders exercising
equal voice in the management. In deference to the statute, the shareholders elected three other "dummy" directors who were to have no
authority other than to vote as directed by the shareholders acting
jointly. When a disagreement ensued between the shareholders, the
"dummy" directors chose to vote with one of the shareholders against
the other in contravention of the agreement. The court found the
agreement illegal and unenforceable, holding that the rights of the
shareholders must be administered as shareholders in the corporation,
not as partners.
13. E.g., Winer, Proposing a New "Fork "Close Corporation Law,"
28 CORNELL L.Q. 313 (1943); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treatment, 12 HAsT. L.J. 227 (1961);
Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms Versus Needs,
11 FLA. L. REv. 433, 473 (1958); Note, Statutory Assistance for Closely
Held Corporations, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1498 (1958); Note, supra note 9.
In an afterword to the last cited student note, Miguel A. de Capriles,
Associate Dean, New York University School of Law, commented that
"as a matter of public policy, there is nc justification for a formalisticperhaps one might say, sadistic-insistnce upon an unnecessary and
unsuitable internal structure or operational organization as a condition
of limited liability in the close corporation ....

To resolve these

problems by the enactment of a special close corporation statute would
in my judgment be in the public interest." 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 743, 745

(1958).
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pression in the close corporation, 14 and there is no reason why
traditional corporate norms should be considered sacrosanct.
As long as all shareholders are in agreement and there is no injury to outsiders, there is no logic in hindering greater flexibility in the internal government of a corporation. 15
These arguments have not been without effect. In recent
years, many courts and some legislatures have become more
cognizant of the special nature of the close corporation. For
example, some courts have gradually come to recognize the fundamental differences between close and publicly held corporations and have begun to apply different rules to each. 16 Similarly, several state legislatures have made substantial attempts
to provide relief for the close corporation.' 7 The Minnesota
legislature has not been oblivious to the close corporation and
several provisions of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act deal
directly with its specific, practical needs.'8 There are, however,
many essential needs of the close corporation which are not met
under the Minnesota act.
The purpose of this Note is to determine the deficiencies of
the Minnesota Business Corporation Act in respect to the close
corporation, examine the current statutory reforms of other
states, and, in light of these reforms, suggest specific reforms of
the Minnesota act.
II. VETO THROUGH GREATER THAN MAJORITY
VOTING REQUIREMENTS
A.

BACKGROUND

As previously noted, the participants in a close corporation
14. Kramer, Foreword, 18 LAW & CONTEmP. PRoa. 433, 434 (1953).

15. Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 427,
428 (1958).
16. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 fll. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965).
For a discussion of several other cases illustrating this change of attitude, see 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 1.15, at 31-32 (1958).
17. North Carolina, New York South Carolina, Florida and Maryland led the trend, followed more recently by statutory reform in Delaware and New Jersey. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 551-55-175 (1965);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1-1401 (McKinney Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-11.1 to 12-31.2 (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.0100-.0107
(Supp. 1967); Ma/.ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-111 (Supp. 1957); DEL. CODE
ANx. tit. 8, subch. 14 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. tit. 14A (1969).
18. See, e.g., INN. STAT. § 301.28(7) (1967), which allows action
by the directors without a meeting, and AnT=. STAT. § 301.28(1) (1967),

which allows fewer than the traditional requirement of at least three
directors.
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commonly think of themselves as partners. In order for the
minority shareholders of a close corporation to realize their expectations in the enterprise, it is often as essential to them as it
is to the minority interests in a partnership to obtain a veto
power over corporate decisions. 19 The scope of such a power
depends upon the needs of the particular shareholders. It may
cover only major corporate matters, such as decisions relating
to amendment of articles, sale of assets, merger, or capital reduction, or it may cover all corporate policy-even the day-today decisions concerning the operation of the enterprise. Since
the incorporators usually expect to become directors or officers,
they may be especially interested in obtaining veto power over
duties, salaries and removal of directors and officers. Obviously,
every shareholder would like the power to prevent his own removal as a director or officer, or a salary reduction for his office.
On the other hand, those participants putting up the bulk of the
capital will usually want a veto power over salary increases,
dividend payments, the purchase or retirement of stock, and the
creation of indebtedness. 20 Veto power is especially crucial
where there are restrictions placed on the transfer of shares, as is
the norm in close corporations,2 1 since only with great difficulty
can a minority shareholder withdraw from the corporation by
22
selling his shares.
Despite the utility of, and often the necessity for, agreements
relating to higher voting requirements for director and shareholder action, the validity of such agreements is open to question under many general incorporation statutes. Such agreements may be found to: (1) run counter to provisions specifying
the requisite plurality for corporate actions; 23 (2) contravene the
traditional form of corporate management, 24 or (3) violate public policy by making the conduct of corporate business difficult
19. Partners may provide for veto power. See UNIFoRm PARTNmsmIp AcT § 18 (1914).

20. O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special By-law and Charter Provisions, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROS. 451, 452 (1958).
21. See part IB infra.
22. 1 F. O'NEA, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 190-91 (1958). It should
also be noted that minority interests without veto power are particularly susceptible to squeeze-outs at disadvantageous terms.

23. See, e.g., Wells v. Beekman Terrace, Inc., 23 Misc. 2d 22, 7

N.Y.2d 142, 197 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Webb v. Morehead, 251

N.C. 394, 111 S.E.2d 586 (1959); Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial
Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209 N.E.2d 553, 261 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568, 571

(Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
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or impossible.2 1 Many states, however, have legislatively approved greater-than-majority voting requirements at both shareholder and director levels. For example, the Model Business
Corporation Act provides that the articles of incorporation are
controlling whenever they require a greater shareholder vote
than required by statute.26 Similarly, with respect to board action, the Model Act provides that a majority vote controls unless
a greater number is required by the articles or bylaws.27 Sim29
28
ilar provisions can be found in the New Jersey and Delaware
statutes.
B.

MnNESOTA LAW

Minnesota's corporation act is silent on greater-than-majority voting requirements for actions by the board of directors. In
regard to shareholder action, the act has no general provision
validating greater-than-majority requirements, but does provide
for such in specified shareholder actions-specifically, for actions relating to amendment of the articles of incorporation, 0
sale of assets,81 merger,32 and stated capital reduction. 3 Although there is nothing in the act prohibiting greater-than-majority requirements for other actions, there is serious question
whether such a requirement would be allowed for acts other
34
than those specifically authorized by the statute.
Under present Minnesota law, however, there are other
means by which a minority shareholder or director can obtain
a certain amount of veto power. Employment security can be
partially satisfied through a long term employment contract.
Since the Minnesota act allows nonvoting stock,8 5 veto power
can be obtained through the classification of shares into voting
and nonvoting stock as long as there are fewer than three share25. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 335-37, 31 S.E.2d 893,
896-97 (1944). O'Neal, supra note 20, at 452.
26.

ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 136 (1964).

27. Id. § 37.
28.
29.

N.J. REV. SmT. §§ 14A: 5-12, 14A: 6-7 (1969).
DEL. CODE AwN. tit. 8, § 216 (1967)

30. M mn.ST. § 301.37 (1967).
31. Id. § 301.36.
32. Id. § 301.42(2).
33. Id. § 301.39(2).
34. Although this point has never been decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the court could easily find that, since the legislature
validated greater-than-majority requirements only for the specified
shareholder actions, it must have intended to disapprove such requirements for all other actions.
35. MnN. STAT. § 301.14 (1967).
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holders. Voting shares could be distributed in such a way as to
be given a balance of voting power and thus a veto. 36 Further,
in view of the Minnesota Supreme Court's liberal attitude
toward shareholder-management agreements, such devices can
37
presumably provide some veto power.
Finally, it may be possible to obtain some veto power
through those provisions of the act allowing high quorum requirements at both shareholder 38 and director levels.3 9 It is
clear, however, that these provisions cannot provide a dependable veto power, since the courts w.uld be reluctant to allow a
shareholder to consistently veto corporate actions simply by boycotting meetings. Even if the praclice were allowed, the dissenting shareholder would have to boycott all meetings since he
will not always know in advance what will be brought up at a
meeting. The result would be that no corporate business could
be transacted.
C. PROPOSED REFORm
Although a certain measure of veto power can be obtained
through the devices previously discussed, they are inadequate to
fulfill the needs of the dissenting shareholder. Clearly the Minnesota legislature should protect minority interests in a close
corporation through the adoption of a general provision, similar
to the Model Act provisions 40 validating greater-than-majority
voting requirements. Further, such a provision should specifically
allow the stockholders to provide for a requirement of unanimity,
thereby avoiding any possible ambiguity. In addition, to protect outsiders, the statute should provide that the requirement
will not bind a transferee unless he has actual notice thereof
or notice of the provision appears conspicuously on the individual shares.41
36. Note that in order to make this device effective, care should be
taken to give each class a veto power over reclassification. An alternative device would be to divide the shares into classes of voting stock
and require voting by classes. In addition to being very cumbersome,
a major drawback of these devices is that subchapter S election is lost
under each. See INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1371.
37. See part IID infra.
38. Mmn'n. STAT. § 301.25(7) (1967).
39. Id. § 301.25(6).
40. See notes 26 &27 supra.
41. Note, supra note 13, at 1508. Shareholders, however, who have
acquiesced in the provision should be bounad by it even though it was not
properly published and the shareholder was unaware of it at the time
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Finally, a provision validating greater-than-majority requirements need not be limited to the close corporation. 2 To
be sure, the risks of deadlock and dissolution are significantly
higher where there are greater-than-majority requirements, but,
as one commentator writes, "these risks . . . should be a matter solely for the judgment of the shareholders; they should not
be a matter of paternalistic preaching by either the courts or
48
the legislature."
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF SHARES
A. BACKGROUND
The partnership nature of the close corporation makes it
essential that the participants be allowed to restrict shareholdings to associates acceptable to them. Ownership and management generally coincide in a close corporation, with the shareholders not uncommonly devoting full time to the business.
These owner-managers typically make business decisions with
little regard to the size of their respective holdings. Participants in a close corporation, therefore, are anxious to limit participation to persons with whom they can work in close confidence. 44
In addition, there are other reasons why stock transfer restrictions are desirable in a close corporation. Participants want
to guard against the acquisition of shares by competitors
who might subvert the enterprise from within by obtaining access to books and records.4 5 Further, close corporations often
try to exclude persons who are solely interested in investment
possibilities, since their interests often conflict with those of the
active owners. For example, active owners would prefer to
withdraw corporate earnings in the form of salaries to avoid
double taxation. Since these salaries often place the ownermanagers in a high tax bracket, they would rather place additional profits in retained earnings than pay them out in dividends.
of his stock purchase. The validity of such a provision as to them
should not depend upon their appearance in a specific instrument, otherwise there may be a frustration of the legitimate expectations of the
shareholders.
42. The New Jersey, Delaware and Model Act do not limit these
provisions to close corporations.
43. Bradley, supra note 11, at 1158.
44. O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planningand Drafting,64 HARV. L. Rrv. 773 (1952).
45.

Id.
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This allows avoidance of personal income tax until stock is sold
and taxed at capital gains rates or until death when the appreciation in the value of the stock will escape income taxation in
toto.46 These practices, however, are obviously not acceptable to
the outside investor who depends on dividends for a return on his
investment. These conflicts could lead to litigation, which is
not only expensive but detrimental to the good will of the
47
business.
The few states which have allowed statutory transfer restrictions48 provide little more than a general authorization for
such restrictions. The Texas Business Corporation Act, for example, provides that "any corporation may impose restrictions
on the sale or other disposition of its shares . . . which do not
unreasonably restrain or prohibit transferability .... ),49 Although these statutes manifest a general legislative approval of
transfer restrictions, their lack of detail engenders some uncertainty as to what constitutes a "reasonable" restriction. The
Delaware statute alleviates some of this uncertainty by specifying in some detail what transfer :restrictions are to be permitted. Its general provision on transfer restrictions-applicable to all corporations, widely held and close-permits restrictions which: (1) give the corporation or its shareholders a right
of first refusal with respect to the restricted shares; (2) obligate
the corporation or its shareholders to buy the restricted shares
when offered by a fellow shareholder; (3) require the corporation or the holders of its securities to approve a proposed transfer
of the restricted securities; (4) prohibit the transfer of the restricted securities to designated persons or classes of persons if
such designation is not manifestly unreasonable, or (5) "any
other lawful restriction on transfer or registration."5' 8 In addition, if a particular transfer restriction on the shares of a cZose
corporation is found unlawful, the corporation is given a 30 day
purchase option to acquire the restricted securities, either at a
46. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
47. O'Neal, supra note 44, at 774.
48. A. FREY, C. MoaIS & J. CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 375 (1966).
49. TEXAS Bus. CORP.ACT art. 2.22 (1957).
50. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 202 (1967). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342
(b) (1967) provides that: "The certificate of incorporation of a close
corporation may set forth the qualifications of stockholders, either by
specifying classes of persons who shall be entitled to be holders of
record of the stock of any class, or by specifying classes of persons who
shall not be entitled to be holder of stock of any class."
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price agreed upon by the parties or at its appraised value.51
Finally, if a transfer of stock is made in violation of any authorized agreement restricting the transferability of a close corporation's shares, the corporation may refuse to register the transferred stock in the name of the transferee.52
B. MuITNOTA LAw
There is no provision in the Minnesota act specifically authorizing restrictions on the transfer of stock. 53 The only Minnesota provisions that deal with transfer restrictions are two Uniform Commercial Code provisions which provide that "[a] lien
upon a security in favor of an issuer thereof is valid against a
purchaser only if the right of the issuer to such a lien is noted
conspicuously on the security" 54 and that "unless noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by
the issuer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except
against a person with actual knowledge of it." 5 Perhaps this
legislative neglect is due in part to the Minnesota Supreme
Court's indication that it would tolerate a reasonable transfer
restriction for which there is a good business reason. In Model
Clothing v. Dickenson," the court held that a "first refusal"
agreement between all stockholders was valid, since it was not
an unreasonable restraint on the power of alienation.
C. PROPOSED REFORm
Even though the Minnesota court has demonstrated a tolerance for reasonable transfer restrictions, legislation specifically
authorizing such agreements is still needed. The security of
sizable investments should not depend on something as unpredictable as judicial tolerance. The reasonableness standard of
Model Clothing is similar to the statutory rule in Texas since
the interpreter is still faced with a question as to what con51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 349 (1967). N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:
7-12(4) (1969) provides similarly except that its coverage is not
limited to the close corporation. Note that the particular advantage of
this provision is that it will allow untried and untested restrictions to
be used with more freedom by reducing the severity of the penalty in
case they are held unreasonable.
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 347 (d) (1967).
53. For a discussion of restriction on the transfer of stock see 1
F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORAZrONS ch. VII (1958).
54. MziN. STAT. § 336.8-103 (1967).
55. Id. § 336.8-204.
56. 146 Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920).
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stitutes a "reasonable" restriction. The Minnesota legislature
could spell out what type of restrictions are to be permitted
by expressly authorizing first options, buy-sell agreements, consent restraints, absolute restraints to designated persons and
"any other lawful restriction on transfer. ' 57 Further, where
a transfer restriction is held to be unreasonable, the statute
should provide means whereby the corporation can acquire the
restricted shares at their appraised value.5 8 However, in order
to protect the interests of both the existing shareholders and
potential transferees, the Minnesota statute should provide that
no transfer restriction shall be valid unless it is unanimously
adopted by the shareholders, appears in either the certificate
of incorporation or the bylaws of the corporation, and is noted
conspicuously on the restricted securities.
Finally, the legislature should be cautious in validating share
transfer restrictions for publicly held corporations. This type of
corporation should have no overriding concern for the identity of
prospective shareholders since they rarely become active in the
business,5 9 and dissatisfied shareholders can easily sell their
shares on the market. Therefore, to avoid any undue restraint
on alienation of shares in the public issue corporation context,
any statutory validation of transfer restrictions should be limited
to the close corporation. 60
57. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(e) (1967).
58. See note 51 supra.
59. Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close
Corporation,33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 700, 714 (1958).
60. It is clear that in order to effectively limit the advantages of
this and other legislation to the close corporation it will be necessary

for the legislature to define what is meant by a "close corporation."

In so doing the legislature should follow the lead of Delaware (see note
1 supra) and adopt particularized criteria which a corporation must
meet. At a minimum such legislation should be made available only to
corporations (1) which have less than 30 shareholders, and (2) whose
shares are not traded on a national securities exchange or regularly
quoted on an over-the-counter market.
Once having so defined and limited thae close corporation, the legis-

lature should again follow the lead of Delaware and provide some

means for the preservation of close corporation status in the event that
status is involuntarily lost. First, the corporation should be given a

reasonable grace period in which to take whatever steps within its
power are necessary to correct the situation. Second, the courts should
be given jurisdiction to issue all orders necessary to restore a corporation's close status by enjoining any act or threatened act either by the
corporation or its shareholders which would destroy that status, including the enjoining of any transfer or threatened transfer of stock in
contravention of a lawful transfer restriction. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 348 (1967).

1970]

SUGGESTIONS FOR STATUTORY RELIEF

1019

IV. SHAREHOLDER VOTING AGREEMENTS
A.

BACKGROUND

It has already been observed that active participation in
management by the owners is normal in the close corporation.
Since under most statutory schemes management is lodged in
a board of directors, it is imperative that each shareholder be
represented on the board if he is to share in the control of the
enterprise. The conventional statutes, however, require that
directors be chosen by the shareholders, acting at a lawful
meeting, upon vote of a plurality, under straight or cumulative
voting. These provisions may make it difficult for a minority
shareholder even under cumulative voting to become elected to
the board.6 ' In order to circumvent such a difficulty, associates
often find it necessary to agree in advance to vote their shares
in such a way as to assure each participant representation on the
board.
Stockholder voting agreements, however, have not always
met with judicial favor,62 although the modern tendency is to
approve them,63 provided a proper purpose can be found.64 In
order to clarify this trend, most modern close corporation
legislation specifically validates shareholder voting agreements.
The New Jersey statute, for example, provides that agreements
between shareholders directing that their votes shall be cast in
a specified manner are valid if in writing and signed. 65 South
Carolina has a similar provision with the additional stipulation
that the agreements be subject to a ten year time limitation.6 6

61. Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13
Bus. LAw. 741, 748 (1958).

62. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 53, § 5.04, at 227.
63. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need
for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L. Rsv. 1145, 1164 (1966).
64. Meyers, The Close CorporationUnder the New South Carolina
CorporationLaw, 16 S.C.L. REv. 577, 580 (1965).
65. N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A: 5-21 (1) (1969) provides as follows:
An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing
and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted
as therein provided, or as they may agree, or as determined in
accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them.
66.

S.C. CODE Ax. § 12-16.15 (Supp. 1962) provides as follows:

An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing
and signed by the parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any voting rights of shares held by the parties, including
any vote with respect to directors, such shares shall be voted as
provided by the agreement, or as the parties may agree or as
determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by the
parties. Such agreement shall be valid and enforceable as be-
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B. !MwIN S TA LAW
Minnesota has no statutory provision nor any case that
validates shareholders' voting agreements. However, in view of
the Minnesota Supreme Court's acceptance of shareholder-management agreements, 7 there is no reason to believe that the
court would not follow the modern trend and allow shareholders' voting agreements provided a proper purpose can be
found.

C. PROPOSED REFOri
Even though the Minnesota court would most likely approve
voting agreements, such agreements should be removed from
the arena of judicial uncertainty. Minnesota should affirmatively validate voting agreements by adopting a provision similar to that of New Jersey.6 Such a provision should be free
of any time limitation, 69 and there is no overriding policy reason why its applicability should be restricted to the close cor70
poration.
This type of provision may not, however, go far enough in
giving a shareholder in a close corporation the protection he
needs. The Minnesota legislature should consider some statutory method by which voting agreements can be specifically
enforced. Such a provision is necessary because of judicial hesitancy to specifically enforce voting agreements. This is demonstrated by Ringling Brothers-Barnum& Bailey Combined Shows,
Incorporated v. Ringling,71 where the Delaware Supreme Court
tween the parties thereto, for a period not to exceed ten years
from the date of its execution. Such agreement may be extended or renewed....
67. See part IID infra.
68. See note 65 supra.
69. It can be argued that such a provision should limit the duration of such contracts in order to preclude the possibility that a voting
agreement of long-term or indefinite duration may become oppressive
to one or more of the parties. Often, however, if an owner-manager
of a close corporation is to realize his expectations in the enterprise he
must be assured of a share of the control on a long-term basis. If the
parties wish to preclude the possibility of later oppression, they can
easily insert a time limitation in their agreement.
70. Neither the New Jersey nor the South Carolina statutes authorizing shareholders' voting agreements (see notes 57 & 59 supra) are limited in applicability to the close corporation. Whether a shareholder
exercises his voting rights independently or in conjunction with others
according to agreement should be a matter of individual discretion rather
than a matter of legislative predetermination in the publicly held as
well as in the close corporation context.
71. 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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held a voting agreement valid, but refused specific enforcement
of the agreement. The court's remedy was confined to refusing
to count the votes of the recalcitrant party, with the result that
the purpose for which the agreement was entered was defeated,
even though the agreement itself was held valid.
No state has yet attempted to preclude this type of result
by enacting a statutory provision providing for mandatory
specific enforcement of voting agreements. 72 One commentator
suggests that a legislature could so provide by directing courts
to issue mandatory injunctions prior to an election, directing the
shares to be cast as agreed. The court could also be directed
to review the outcome of a contested election and to consider
all shares to have been voted as agreed under any valid voting
agreement. The nonconforming voter would be allowed the
defense of petitioner's own contractual breach or his breach of
73
any fiduciary duty to the defendant.
V. SHAREHOLDER-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
A.

BACKGROUND

It is well settled that the board of directors of a publicly
held corporation should be free to exercise its judgment independent of interference from shareholders. Such a requirement,
however, is unrealistic, impractical and, in respect to minority
interests, oppressive, when applied to the close corporation.
Since the shareholder commonly invests all his time and fortune
in the corporation, management decisions are often directly related to the individual shareholder's economic security. This
leads to a higher probability of intershareholder dissension resulting in an oppression of minority interests by the majority.74
In order to avoid this state of affairs, the owner-managers
frequently attempt to preclude future conflict by binding
themselves through shareholders' agreements to certain future
75
conduct which can be specifically enforced.
In general, however, courts have been hostile to shareholder-management agreements and uniformly strike them
down whenever they are found to transgress statutes requiring
72. MnD. AxN. CODE art. 23, § 104 (Supp. 1957), provides that shareholders' agreements may in the discretion of the court "be enforced by
injunction or by such other relief as the court may determine to be fair
and appropriate in the circumstances."
73. Bradley, supra note 63, at 1163.
74. Note, supra note 59, at 719.
75. Id.
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that a board of directors manage the corporation. 76 Unfortunately, this approach precludes the use of the device, since the
agreements most useful to the close corporation will always
restrict the freedom of the board. For example, shareholders'
agreements dealing with removal of officers, dividend distribuand dissolution would
tion, employment contracts, arbitration
77
likely be struck down on this basis.
There is no good reason to continue to prohibit these types
of agreements for the close corporation. The requirement that
the board of directors manage the company independently was
designed to assure responsible management to investors in a
publicly held company. Such assurance is not necessary in a
close corporation where ownership and management coincide.
Further, such agreements do not injure either creditors or the
public. In fact, they may even benefit creditors and the public
by insuring that the operation of ;he company will continue
smoothly without debilitating internal conflict.78 Finally, our
systems of economics and jurisprudence are designed to provide
individuals with the freedom to arrange their economic affairs
through contracts which are not against public policy.79
In recognition of these facts, many state legislatures have
amended corporation statutes to permit shareholders' agreements
which restrict the independence of the board of directors. The
New York statute, for example, specifically validates such agreements if they appear in the certificate of incorporation and have
the approval of the holders of all outstanding shares.80 Florida's statute is similar, but it also provides detailed guidance as
to what type of shareholders' agreements are lawful by specifically allowing those which relate to: (1) the management of the
business of the corporation; (2) the declaration and payment of
dividends or division of profits; (3) the election of officers and
directors, and (4) restrictions on transfers of stock.81
76. The two leading cases on this point are McQuade v. Stoneham,
263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934), and Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199
N.E. 641 (1936).

Note, supra note 59, at 719.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 713.
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 620 (b) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
81. FLA. STAT. AN. 608.0605 (1963). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 1216.22 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEm. STAT. §§ 5-73(b), 55-24(b) (1965); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 23, § 104 (Supp. 1957); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:5-21(2)
77.
78.
79.
80.

(1969).
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The Minnesota Business Corporation Act unequivocally
states that "the business of a corporation shall be managed by a
board of directors."8 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court, on the
other hand, has shown itself to be receptive to shareholder
management agreements. In Hart v. Bell,8 3 a defendant shareholder was induced to lend large sums of money to his floundering corporation. An agreement among all shareholders provided that no dividends were to be declared until all loans were
repaid to defendant. The court upheld the agreement, stating:
The practical conduct of a modern business corporation
compels a frank recognition that "an agreement by a number
of stockholders to combine their votes in order to effectuate
a particular policy is not of itself unlawful in the absence of
evidence of an intent to defraud the other stockholders or to
secure a private benefit
8 4 at the expense of the corporation or
the other stockholders."
C. PRoPosED REFORM
Despite the rather far-reaching language of Hart, legislation
is needed to insure the validity of shareholder-management
agreements. The agreement should be valid whether embodied
in the articles of incorporation, the bylaws, or even in a side
agreement. 85 While some statutes require that the agreement
be embodied in the articles of incorporation, 6 the reason for such
a restriction is not clear, although the drafters could have been
concerned with notice to those dealing with the corporation.
If so, the requirement is not warranted. First, it is questionable whether third parties examine the articles in this context,
or, for that matter, should be bound by them. In addition, an
inadvertent failure to include the agreement in the articles might
allow a party to renege on his contractual obligations. 87 Further,
a provision requiring embodiment in the certificate of incorporation would have the effect of invalidating any agreement
entered into before the enactment of the statute if any party was
88
unwilling to incorporate the agreement into the certificate.
There should also be an unequivocal requirement that any
MiNN.STAT. § 301.28 (1967).
83. 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946).
84. Id. at 78, 23 N.W.2d at 380.
85. See FLA. STAT. AwN. § 608.0105 (1963).
86. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:5-21 (1969).
87. Meyers, supranote 64, at 588.
88. Bradley, supra note 63, at 1183.
82.
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shareholder-management agreement have unanimous shareholder
consent. This is necessary because of the inherent possibility that
such agreements will be used by majority interests to suppress
minority interests not parties to the agreement. In addition, in
order to insure that liability for managerial acts will continue
to be commensurate with responsibility, any statute validating
shareholders' agreements relating to management should contain a provision imposing liability upon shareholders for managerial acts and omissions to the extent that the discretion or
powers of the directors are controlled by the agreement. 89 Finally, in order to insure responsible management to widespread
investors in a publicly held company, the application of such
a statutory provision should be limited to the close corporation.9
A question which can always arise under statutory provisions
validating these shareholders' agreements is whether such provisions can be read to allow the elimination of the board of directors altogether. There is no overriding policy reason why
the owner-managers of a close corporation should be encumbered by a statutory board of directors requirement. Thus, a
revision of the Minnesota act should avoid any possible ambiguity
by adopting a provision allowing a close corporation to be managed directly by the stockholders in place of a board of directors.9 1
VI. DISSOLUTION
A.

BACKGROUND

Due to dissension, voting distribution, higher voting re89. Id. Meyers, supra note 64, at 588-89. N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:
5-21 (5) (1969), for example, provides as follows:
The effect of any such agreement shall be to relieve the directors and impose upon the shareho]ders the liability for managerial acts or omissions that is impcsed on directors by law to
the extent that, and so long as, the discretion or powers of the
directors in their management of the corporate affairs is controlled by any such provision.
90. See note 72 supra.
91. DEL,. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1967), for example, provides as
follows:
The certificate of incorporation of a close corporation may
provide that the business of the corporation shall be managed
by the stockholders of the corporationi rather than by a board of
directors. So long as this provision continues in effect,
(1) No meeting of the stockholders need to be called to
elect directors;
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the
stockholders of the corporation shall be deemed to be directors;
(3) The stockholders of the corporation shall be subject to
all liabilities of the directors.
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quirements and many other factors inherent in any closely held
enterprise, seriously disabling deadlocks frequently occur among
the shareholders and directors of a closely held corporation. 2
When this state of affairs develops, a dissatisfied shareholder
may find himself in an almost impossible situation. Unlike a
partner, 3 he cannot simply terminate the enterprise and get
out. At the same time, unlike a shareholder of a publicly held
company, he cannot simply sell his shares, since the shares of a
close corporation rarely have a ready market. To make matters
worse, the shares of a close corporation are, as previously noted,
often subject to transfer restrictions, which may enable an
obstinate associate to prevent any sale of the shares whatever.9 4
Frequently, the result is that the only remedy available to a
dissatisfied shareholder is to attempt a dissolution of the corporation.
Under most general corporation statutes, however, even this
remedy may be unavailable.9 5 In order to rectify this situation several states have adopted statutes designed to give close
corporation shareholders easier access to dissolution. New Jersey 98 and Delaware, 97 for example, allow incorporators to provide in the certificate of incorporation that any dissatisfied shareholder may effect a dissolution of the corporation at will or upon
98
the occurrence of specified events.
B.

MiNNSOTA LAW

The Minnesota act provides for either voluntary or involuntary dissolution. Voluntary dissolution may be instituted
92. 2

F. O'NEAL,

supra note 53, § 9.02, at 166-167.

U~voRm PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 (1914).
94. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 53, § 9.02, at 167.
93.

95. See text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.
96. N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A: 12-5 (1) (1969) provides as follows:
The certificate of incorporation may provide that any shareholder, or any specified number of shareholders, or the holders

of any specified number or proportion of any class or series,

may effect the dissolution of the corporation at will or upon
the occurrence of a specified event.
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355(a) (1967) provides as follows:
The certificate of incorporation of any close corporation
may include a provision granting to any stockholder, or the
holders of any specified number or percentage of shares of any
class of stock, an option to have the corporation dissolved at
will or upon the occurrence of any specified event or contingency.
98. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 104(a) (3) (1967); N.C.
GSEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (3) (1965); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1002 (McKin-

ney Supp. 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63-379, § 8 (1963).
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upon the approval of at least two-thirds of the voting power of
the shareholders. 99 It is obvious that this provision will not
aid the dissatisfied shareholder of a close corporation since a
corporation which is already deadlocked because of high voting
requirements will presumably not be able to muster the twothirds majority required for dissolution.100 Shareholders often
try to resolve this problem in advance through various types of
agreements, the most common of wlich is that each shareholder
will vote for dissolution if a deadlock continues for a stated
period of time.'01 In order for such an agreement to be enforceable, however, there would have to be some general statutory validation of shareholders' agreements which impinge on
the power of the board of directors. Minnesota as noted previ10 2
ously, has no such validation.
Under the Minnesota act a dissatisfied shareholder may
petition for involuntary dissolution of the corporation' 03 on the
ground "that there is internal dissension and that two or more
factions of the shareholders in the corporation are so deadlocked
that its business cannot longer be conducted with advantage to
its shareholders .... 104 This provision, however, does not
provide adequate relief since the Minnesota court has limited
its effect by permitting dissolution only when the dissension or
deadlock renders the corporation insolvent or unprofitable, apparently under the assumption that dissolution of a prosperous
corporation will injure not only the majority stockholders, but
the public as well. 0 5 This view may be justified when applied
to a public corporation where a dissatisfied shareholder can
easily redeem his investment by selliag his shares, but it is clearly
oppressive when applied to a close corporation where a shareholder can protect his investment only through effecting a dissolution. A part owner of an incorporated partnership should,
to the same extent as an ordinary partner, be allowed to dissolve the company whether it is prosperous or not. 0 6
99. MmN. STAT.§ 301.47 (1967).
100. Note, supra note 59, at 735.

101. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of

Deadlock and Dissolution,19 U. CHI.L. Rsv. 778 (1952).
102. See part Ib supra.
103. MAUN. STAT. § 301.50(1) (1967).
104. Id. § 301.49(4).
105. See, e.g., In re Hedberg-Freuegeun & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 47
N.W.2d 424 (1951); Note, supra note 59, at 735.
106. Note, supra note 59, at 735.
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C. PROPOSED REFORM
The Minnesota legislature should follow the examples of
Delaware and New Jersey and allow dissenting shareholders
of a close corporation the power to effect dissolution at will. Any
such provision, however, should be limited to the close corporation. A remedy as drastic as dissolution should obviously not
be given to a minority shareholder of a publicly held company0 "
because of the great potential injustice to other investors and
because he can easily sell his shares on the open market. In
addition, there is a great public interest in the continuation of
such businesses. This public interest, however, should yield to
the dissident minority shareholder in a close corporation whose
only choice is to sell out cheaply or retain an investment upon
which he may garner no return. 0 8
In addition to providing an individual shareholder of a close
corporation with access to dissolution, the Minnesota legislature
should consider instituting other statutory methods of resolving
deadlocks, short of dissolution. In those cases where for some
reason dissolution is not a satisfactory remedy (where, for example, it would result in loss of value or in expensive and time
consuming litigation), the Minnesota act should provide that
the shareholder, rather than dissolving the corporation, may
petition a court either to appoint a custodian to temporarily take
control of the company, 0 9 or alternatively, to have a provisional
director appointed to break a deadlock on the board of directors. 1 0
VII. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the Minnesota close corporation has special
needs which can only be fulfilled by revision of the Minnesota
Business Corporation Act. Such legislation should be based on
the recognition that the close corporation is a legitimate business
enterprise. It should be found on the premise that there is no
sacred, logical or necessary connection between limited liability
and the operation of a corporate enterprise in a certain way. The
price the participants in a close corporation have to pay for limited liability should not include the necessity of running their enterprise according to an inflexible, traditional, corporate blue107.
108.
109.
110.

Symposium, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 412 (1957).
Note, supranote 59, at 716.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 352 (1967).
Id. § 353.
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print. Contemporary business practice should be a crucial factor
in the development of corporate law, and public corporations and
close corporations can no longer realistically be made to conform
to a single operating procedure. As long as the deviations from
the traditional corporate pattern are limited to internal control
and management, are accepted by all the shareholders, and cause
no injury to outsiders, a close corporation should be allowed to
operate as flexibly as its needs demand.

